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STANDING AFTER SNOWDEN: LESSONS ON PRIVACY
HARM FROM NATIONAL SECURITY
SURVEILLANCE LITIGATION
Margot E. Kaminski*

ABSTRACT
Article III standing is difficult to achieve in the context of data security and data privacy claims. Injury in fact must be “concrete,” “particularized,” and “actual or imminent”—all characteristics that are
challenging to meet with information harms. This Article suggests
looking to an unusual source for clarification on privacy and standing:
recent national security surveillance litigation. There we can find significant discussions of what rises to the level of Article III injury in fact.
The answers may be surprising: the interception of sensitive information; the seizure of less sensitive information and housing of it in a
database for analysis; and harms arising from data analytics have all
been taken seriously in recent national security cases. This Article
closes by noting that no discussion of corporate responsibility and data
theft can be complete without addressing the roles corporations play in
challenging the national security state.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data security is a significant problem. In 2013, forty million customer credit card numbers were taken from the retail giant Target.1
The Target hack yielded seventy million records with shoppers’
names, addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers.2 In 2015, the
extramarital hookup website Ashley Madison was hacked for identifying information about its thirty-seven million users.3 Also in 2015, the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) data breach revealed the So* Assistant Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. Thanks to
Paul Ohm for workshopping this at an earlier stage, and to my fellow panelists Andrea
Matwyshyn and Felix Wu.
1. Brian Krebs, The Target Breach, by the Numbers, KREBS ON SECURITY (May 6, 2014), http:/
/krebsonsecurity.com/2014/05/the-target-breach-by-the-numbers/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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cial Security Numbers of an estimated 21.5 million people, and the
fingerprint records of an estimated 5.6 million people.4
Discussions of corporate and governmental responsibility have no
doubt increased in the wake of these events, each of which has come
with a high price tag for cleaning up the aftermath. Yet the U.S. legal
system stumbles in assigning responsibility for data harms. The firstorder hurdle—recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins5—is standing. What harm must a person show to get a
data breach case in front of a court?
Standing to sue is one of the larger problems for both data breach
and data privacy litigation. As one court explained, “even though injury-in-fact may not generally be Mount Everest . . . in data privacy
cases . . . the doctrine might still reasonably be described as Kilimanjaro.”6 Lower courts struggle with standing in data breach and data
privacy cases, and have produced varied results.7 Courts, desperate to
find something tangible, sometimes resort to looking to more measurable proxies for injury, such as increased cellular phone battery usage
when an app repeatedly requests updates on a user.8 These proxies do
not indicate where real privacy harms lie. How can courts better determine when a plaintiff gets into court?
4. Keith Wagstaff et al., OPM: 21.5 Million People Affected by Background Check Breach,
NBC NEWS (July 9, 2015, 8:12 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/opm-hack-securitybreach-n389476; see also Andrea Peterson, OPM Says 5.6 Million Fingerprints Stolen in Cyberattack, Five Times as Many as Previously Thought, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/23/opm-now-says-more-than-five-millionfingerprints-compromised-in-breaches/. It now appears that the OPM breach included not only
background check information, but also security clearance information with details about employees’ personal lives, including law enforcement records, polygraph data and information
about journalists who had access to federal buildings. See Michael Adams, Why the OPM Hack
Is Far Worse than You Imagine, LAWFARE (Mar. 11, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/why-opm-hack-far-worse-you-imagine; Lisa Rein, The Chinese Didn’t Just
Hack Federal Employees. Journalists Were Swept Up in the Massive Breach, Too, WASH. POST
(Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/12/14/the-chinesedidnt-just-hack-federal-employees-journalists-were-swept-up-in-the-massive-breach-too/.
5. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
6. In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
7. Compare Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding standing), and In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 2014), with Katz v.
Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (denying standing), Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664
F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011), Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir. 2007), In re
Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 962 (D. Nev. 2015),
Green v. eBay Inc., 2015 WL 2066531, at *2 (E.D. La. May 4, 2015), and Galaria v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
8. See In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 2013 WL 1283236, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2013) (finding standing to sue Google for changes to its privacy policy on the basis of
increased cell battery usage).
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To answer this question, this Article turns to a source often overlooked in these conversations: national security litigation. At first
glance, this may seem like a terrible idea. Courts historically have
been highly deferential to the government over national security
claims. Looking to these standards to clarify standing in the private
sector context could produce results that skew heavily against
plaintiffs.
However, in the years since 2013, when security contractor Edward
Snowden revealed information about U.S. national security surveillance,9 U.S. courts have repeatedly confronted both standing and privacy harm in the context of national security surveillance litigation.
The ensuing discussions of standing, arising around the First and
Fourth Amendments, can provide valuable insights for the discussion
of standing and data breaches in the private sector context.
This Article’s closing claim is more normative. National security
litigation can actually be an important component of corporate responsibility. Just as corporations can develop tools to provide security
against government surveillance, they can and should sue the government on behalf of themselves and, sometimes, their customers. Corporations are often better situated than most individuals to sue. They
have deep pockets; moreover, they are better situated under current
doctrine because they can articulate claims on behalf of more individuals, perhaps increasing the chances that the claims will make it into
court.
II. THE PRIVACY STANDING PROBLEM
Courts are almost uniquely disinclined to recognize intangible
harms in the area of privacy law. The legal standard for Article III
standing is that a person must show “injury in fact” that is “concrete
and particularized,” as well as “actual or imminent,” as outlined by
the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.10 These requirements sit particularly uncomfortably with information harms.11 Information harms are certainly not “concrete” in the sense that they are
tangible things one can hold in one’s hand or easily measure in dollars.
Courts appear to prefer harms that are “visceral and vested”—harms
9. Joshua Eaton, Guardian Announces Leak of Classified NSA Documents, AL JAZEERA AM.
(June 5, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/multimedia/timeline-edward-snowdenrevelations.html.
10. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
11. See generally Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in
the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2016).
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they can physically feel, that are measurable, and have already
occurred.12
Similarly, information harms are rarely “particularized.” They occur to millions of people, often in diffuse ways. Courts may worry that
recognizing information harms will open the floodgates to litigation
equivalent to taxpayer litigation: everybody who wants to might get
into court. Information harms also often challenge the requirement
that an injury be “actual or imminent.” If we do not count information acquisition itself as harm, then any consequent economic effects
of a breach might not be felt for years, yet plausibly could also occur
at any instant.13
The hurdles to bringing claims for privacy harms are higher than in
other areas of the law.14 Courts regularly recognize intangible harms
in cases with torts involving privacy, breach of confidence, and employment discrimination.15 A wide variety of torts, ranging from assault to loss of consortium, serve to remedy “ethereal” emotional
harms.16 Courts have in other areas recognized that a significant risk
of future harm may constitute a present harm.17 Yet in the information privacy context, the Supreme Court and others have repeatedly
asked for privacy plaintiffs to show something more.18
The Supreme Court most recently assessed privacy harm and Article III standing in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins.19 In May 2016, an eightmember Supreme Court addressed in Spokeo whether the plaintiff
(Robins) had standing to sue under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of
1970 (FCRA).20 A six justice majority found that the Ninth Circuit
had failed to properly evaluate Article III standing and remanded the
case back to the Court of Appeals.21
12. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2885638; see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Data Security Violations:
What’s the Harm?, LINKEDIN (June 25, 2014), https://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/
20140625045136-2259773-privacy-and-data-security-violations-what-s-the-harm.
13. Kreimer, supra note 11, at 774–75 (noting that “the penetrating qualities of the internet
blur the line of “imminence”).
14. Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 361–62
(2014); see also Citron & Solove, supra note 12 (manuscript at 23).
15. Citron & Solove, supra note 12 (manuscript at 23).
16. Calo, supra note 14 at 363; see also Citron & Solove, supra note 12 (manuscript at 23).
17. Id. (manuscript at 26) (citing Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 561–62 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (recognizing a risk of cancer due to exposure to asbestos as present
injury)).
18. Devlin, 495 A.2d at 503.
19. 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
20. Id. at 1544.
21. Id. at 1550.
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The Court explained that Article III injury in fact must be both particularized and concrete, and that while the Ninth Circuit had found
particularized injury, it had not evaluated whether the injury was
“concrete.”22 As to what constitutes “concrete” injury in the privacy
context, the Court gave few guidelines. The majority explained that
concrete injury need not be actually tangible; “intangible injuries can
nevertheless be concrete.”23 To determine whether an intangible
harm constitutes injury in fact, courts should look to both history and
Congressional action as “instructive and important.”24 However, and
confusingly, while Congress can sometimes legislate new injuries into
existence, Congress cannot always legislate injury in fact into existence.25 In particular, the court explained that “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” does not constitute an
injury in fact.26
Thus according to the Court in Spokeo, Article III standing creates
a Constitutional floor for Congress, though Congress can also somehow influence the floor by creating new rights. In some cases, violating a right granted by statute can be enough to constitute injury in
fact, but in others, it appears courts will read in additional requirements.27 How to line draw between these two is the exceedingly difficult question.
In Spokeo, the Court also nodded to an array of intangible yet concrete harms. The majority explained that a “risk of real harm” can
satisfy the concreteness requirement, and that the law permits recovery by libel and slander victims even if those intangible harms are
hard to measure.28 Other Congressionally created information-related harms count, too, such as being unable to procure information
through open government laws.29
22. Id. at 1545.
23. Id. at 1549.
24. Id.
25. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible
harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to
vindicate that right.”); see also id. at 1547–48 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (“Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a
plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”)).
26. Id. at 1549.
27. Id. at 1549–50; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (“[B]roadening the
categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.”).
28. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
29. Id. (referring to the Federal Advisory Committee Act disclosure requirements and election disclosures).
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With respect to FCRA, the statute at issue, the Spokeo majority
clarified that it took no position as to whether Robins had adequately
alleged an injury in fact.30 The Court did, however, provide two
FCRA-specific examples as guidance. A procedural violation of
FCRA’s notice requirement might not actually be harmful to a consumer, according to the majority, because the underlying information
in the consumer profile might be “entirely accurate.”31 Similarly, the
majority observed that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any
material risk of harm.”32 The Court gave the example of an inaccurate zip code: “It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an
incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”33
Critics responded that an inaccurate zip code can certainly lead to
concrete harm, such as being treated differently for credit purposes
because you are from a predominantly African American neighborhood (a historic discriminatory practice known as “redlining”).34
What are we to make of Spokeo? The decision puts off the more
difficult questions for now. The truly thorny issues go back down to
the Ninth Circuit, so that the Court—preferably one of nine members—can address them at a later time. At the same time, rather than
requiring proof of economic or physical harms or threatened retaliation, the opinion acknowledges the adequacy of some intangible
harms. The Court’s references to libel, slander, and risk all suggest a
broader view of privacy and standing than those advocated by the late
Justice Scalia and discussed further below. On the other hand, the
majority’s very brief analysis of FCRA itself evinces skepticism of
both notice requirements and accuracy requirements—features that
are central to most privacy laws.35
Since Spokeo, several federal courts have dismissed information privacy claims for failure to assert a concrete injury in fact. A federal
judge in the Southern District of Ohio found that job applicants at
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1550.
Id.
Id. at 1550.
Id.
G.S. Hans, Spokeo Ruling Gives Few “Concrete” Answers on Privacy Rights, CTR. DEMOCRACY & TECH. (May 17, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/spokeo-ruling-gives-few-concrete-an
swers-on-privacy-rights/ (“ZIP codes, on their own, were used for redlining housing districts to
keep out African-American families, which we would now consider a clear violation of individual rights.”).
35. And to the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), established by the HEW and
adopted by the OECD and countries around the world. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC’Y, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/privacy-policy-guidance-memorandum-2008-01.pdf.
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The Ohio State University had no standing to sue under FCRA.36 At
least three district courts have found that failing to comply with
FCRA’s (b)(1) certification requirement—which requires that companies requesting credit reports certify their compliance with FCRA —
did not by itself give rise to a “concrete” injury under Spokeo.37 A
federal judge in Maryland remanded a class action against a hacked
hospital to state court, reasoning that the hacking of patient information, such as names, addresses, dates of birth, and private health care
information, did not rise to the level of concrete injury.38 A federal
judge in Wisconsin dismissed a class action against Time Warner
Cable for an alleged violation of the Cable Communications Policy
Act (CCPA), which requires the destruction of customers’ personally
identifiable information after it is no longer being used for the purpose for which it was collected.39 The Eighth Circuit similarly found
that a statutory violation of the “duty to destroy personally identifiable information by retaining certain information longer than the
company should have kept it” failed to establish an injury in fact.40
Several lower courts have found standing after Spokeo, looking to the
two prongs of guidance identified by the Supreme Court: history and
legislative action.41 However, Spokeo has not overall provided more
36. See Smith v. Ohio State Univ., No. 15-CV-3030, 2016 WL 3182675, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June
8, 2016); see also Tyus, v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 15-CV-1467, 2016 WL 6108942, at *6 (E.D. Wis.
Oct. 19, 2016) (holding that inclusion of extraneous information on (b)(2) notice is not a “concrete” injury), rev’d in part on other grounds on reh’g, No. 15-CV-1467, 2017 WL 52609 (E.D.
Wis. Jan. 4, 2017); Nokchan v. Lyft, Inc., No. 15-CV-03008 JCS, 2016 WL 5815287, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 5, 2016); Fisher v. Enter. Holdings, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-00372 AGF, 2016 WL 4665899, at
*1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2016).
37. See Larroque v. First Advantage LNS Screening Sols., Inc., No. 15-CV-04684-JSC, 2016
WL 4577257, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016); Disalvo v. Intellicorp Records, Inc., No. 1:16-CV1697, 2016 WL 5405258, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2016). But see Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC,
No. 3:13-CV-825, 2016 WL 3653878, at *7 (E.D. Va. June 30, 2016) (finding that (b)(2) creates
two rights which, when violated, each give rise to “concrete” injuries: (1) “a right to privacy in
one’s consumer report,” and (2) “a right to specific information in the form of a clear and conspicuous” notice that one’s consumer report would be released).
38. See Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 WL 2946165, at *7 (D.
Md. May 19, 2016).
39. See Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 15-cv-1078-pp, 2016 WL 3390415, at *1 (E.D.
Wis. June 17, 2016).
40. Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016); see also May v.
Consumer Adjustment Co., No. 4:14-CV-166 HEA, 2017 WL 227964, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 19,
2017).
41. Perlin v. Time, No. 16-10635, 2017 WL 605291, at *12–13 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2017) (finding post-Spokeo that a violation of Michigan’s video privacy act (VRPA) “is sufficient to satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement” and is “not a bare procedural violation”); see also Church v.
Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016) (applying
Spokeo and holding that “through the [federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act], Congress has
created a new right—the right to receive [certain] required disclosures in communications governed by the [Act]—and a new injury—not receiving such disclosures.”); In re Nickelodeon Con-
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privacy protections; if anything, it has given lower courts more fodder
for dismissing privacy claims. The Supreme Court has left intact the
general sense of judicial skepticism over privacy injury.
Danielle Citron and Dan Solove recently proposed a framework for
better evaluating privacy harms.42 For data breach cases, they propose looking to the magnitude and likelihood of the potential harm,
data sensitivity and data exposure, mitigating actions, and the reasonableness of preventative measures.43 For other privacy violations,
they propose less of a risk-based analysis and, instead, focus on what
constitutes reasonable emotional distress.44
These proposed frameworks, however, still look for some kind of
injury beyond the mere unapproved sharing of information.45 What is
striking about the national security cases following Amnesty and discussed at length below is that many find standing solely because information has been shared without permission. This is consistent with at
least two post-Spokeo cases finding that unauthorized disclosure alone
may constitute injury in fact.46
III.

STANDING AFTER SNOWDEN

What counts as a privacy harm? Surprisingly, recent national security litigation may yield answers that are friendlier to privacy than data
breach litigation has been. In the wake of Snowden’s revelations of
the extent of U.S. national security surveillance, courts have had to
evaluate what plaintiffs must show to articulate Article III injury in
fact. The ensuing cases yield lessons about privacy and injury in fact.
A. Clapper v. Amnesty International and the Snowden Leaks
The leading case on standing and national security surveillance is
the much misunderstood Clapper v. Amnesty International,47 decided
by the Supreme Court in February 2013. The Amnesty plaintiffs
sumer Privacy Litig., No. 15-1441, 2016 WL 3513782, at *7 (3d Cir. June 27, 2016) (holding that
disclosure of information in violation of the federal Video Privacy Protection Act resulted in a
concrete harm “in the sense that it involve[d] a clear de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure
of legally protected information.”).
42. Citron & Solove, supra note 12 (manuscript at 5).
43. Id. at 28–29.
44. Id. at 30–31.
45. Id. at 10 (explaining that courts have generally refused to recognize harm in circumstances
when data is shared with other companies without permission). The Court then proposes the
risk-based multi-part framework for evaluating when privacy harm occurs in data breaches. Id.
at 42–44.
46. See Perlin, 2017 WL 605291, at *12; In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 151441, 2016 WL 3513782, at *7 (3d Cir. June 27, 2016).
47. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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facially challenged Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act on the
day the statute was enacted.48 Because this was a facial challenge, and
because the government kept the extent of its surveillance programs
largely secret, the Court observed that “respondents fail to offer any
evidence” of actual government surveillance and “have no actual
knowledge” of any surveillance programs under Section 702.49 Characterizing the plaintiffs’ claim that they would be subject to surveillance as “highly speculative,” the Court refused under those
circumstances to find standing.50
Then in June 2013, a mere four months after Amnesty, the Snowden
stories began. First, The Guardian revealed the government’s program for gathering phone subscriber metadata (that is, phone numbers dialed, among other things) under Section 215 of the Patriot
Act.51 Then both The Guardian and The Washington Post revealed
that the U.S. government was obtaining communications content directly from communications providers under its Section 702 authority
through a program called PRISM.52 Subsequent news stories revealed
that the government was conducting backbone surveillance through
the fiber-optic cables of service providers like Google,53 targeting encrypted content,54 gathering content directly through communications
infrastructure using “Upstream” surveillance,55 and much more.
The challenge in Amnesty was that plaintiffs could not show they
had in fact been surveilled for purposes of standing, because they had
no actual knowledge of the existence of any government surveillance
programs arising under the statute. They had no actual knowledge of
48. Id. at 1146.
49. Id. at 1148.
50. Id.
51. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsaphone-records-verizon-court-order. See generally Joshua Eaton, Timeline of Edward Snowden’s
Revelations, AL JAZEERA AM., http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/multimedia/timeline-ed
ward-snowden-revelations.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
52. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-06/news/39784046_1_prism-nsa-u-s-servers; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen
MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN
(June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
53. Nicole Perlroth & John Markoff, N.S.A May Have Hit Internet Companies at a Weak Spot,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/technology/a-peephole-for-thensa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
54. Jake Appelbaum et al., NSA Targets the Privacy-Conscious, DAS ERSTE (July 3, 2014, 5:08
PM), http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html.
55. Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables, WASH. POST (July 10,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/
07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html.
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these government surveillance programs because the programs were
kept secret by the plaintiffs’ adversary—the government. After the
Snowden leaks, that changed.56 As Snowden asked American Civil
Liberties Union attorney Ben Wizner in their first online conversation: “Do you have standing now?”57
B. Standing After Snowden
Amnesty is now often cited for the proposition that injury must be
“certainly impending” to constitute injury in fact,58 but what this
means has been misunderstood by lower courts.59 In Amnesty, the
Court described five links in a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” that compounded together did “not satisfy the requirement that
threatened injury must be certainly impending.”60 In other words, the
plaintiffs could not show that government surveillance itself was certainly impending—the Court, in its assessment of standing in Amnesty, was not referring to a requirement of additional tangible
economic or physical harms. Subsequent cases have misunderstood
Amnesty to require that in addition to the unauthorized appropriation
of information, privacy and data breach plaintiffs must show other
certainly impending harms.61
Two of the links in Amnesty’s “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” were broken by the Snowden stories. The Court did not at the
time of Amnesty know what surveillance programs existed under Section 702 or the extent to which the FISA Court had authorized or
restricted these programs. After Snowden, the plaintiffs knew both.
In fact, after Snowden, some plaintiffs knew even more: They themselves were definitely the subjects of metadata surveillance.
1. Interception of Communications Content Alone Can Be Injury in
Fact
The Court made an important point in Amnesty that has been often
overlooked. The majority and dissent agreed that if a plaintiff could
56. But see Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 551, 553 (2014) (“[A]lthough these disclosures seem to give even greater credence
to the plaintiffs’ allegations in Clapper, they don’t necessarily cure the standing defect identified
by Justice Alito.”).
57. Kashmir Hill, How ACLU Attorney Ben Wizner Became Snowden’s Lawyer, FORBES
(Mar. 10, 2014, 4:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/03/10/how-aclu-attorneyben-wizner-became-snowdens-lawyer/.
58. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
59. Kreimer, supra note 11, at 766.
60. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).
61. Kreimer, supra note 11, at 765 n.70.
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show actual interception of the content of communications, then the
plaintiff would have Article III standing.62 Justice Breyer, writing for
the dissent, observed that “[n]o one here denies that the Government’s interception of a private telephone or e-mail conversation
amounts to an injury that is ‘concrete and particularized.’”63 Justice
Alito, writing for the majority, appeared to agree.64
One of the lessons from national security surveillance litigation,
then, is that the interception of communications by an unintended
third party can constitute injury in fact.65 Courts citing Amnesty in
data breach cases often cite it for the proposition that a plaintiff must
show “certainly impending” harm beyond the illicit breach itself, such
as economic harm.66 That characterization of Amnesty is incorrect. If
anything, Amnesty suggests that when communications content is
hacked by a third-party (in that case, the government), the interception alone constitutes injury in fact.
2. Seizure and Maintenance of a Database of Nonsensitive
Information Can Be Injury in Fact
Many data breach and data privacy lawsuits do not involve wiretapping or hacking the contents of private communications. They tend,
instead, to involve the seizure of data points about individuals. For
example, plaintiffs in a class action sued Urban Outfitters and Anthropologie over the collection of customer zip codes—precisely the kind
of information the Supreme Court suggested is inherently not harmful
in Spokeo.67 Can the bulk gathering of individually nonsensitive data
points create privacy harms? Again, post-Snowden national security
surveillance case law is illuminating. In several cases since the
Snowden revelations, lower courts have had to determine whether
government seizure of customer call records gives rise to standing
under Article III. Courts have said that the seizure of these records,
with nothing more, is enough to demonstrate injury in fact. This sug62. Id. at 1156.
63. Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1153 (explaining that the case would look like Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), and Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), in
which plaintiffs would have standing if, on remand, they could show actual acquisition of content
information).
65. Kreimer, supra note 11, at 759.
66. Id. at 765 n.70 (listing several cases that cite this proposition).
67. Brandon Lowrey, Urban Outfitters ZIP Code Class Says It Can Pass Spokeo Test, LAW360
(June 24, 2016, 11:09 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/811008/urban-outfitters-zip-codeclass-says-it-can-pass-spokeo-test.
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gests that the bulk collection of nonsensitive information and storage
in a database can itself be harm, without additional showings.
In 2015, the Second Circuit determined in ACLU v. Clapper68 that
government seizure of Verizon Business call records gave rise to injury in fact for a Fourth Amendment claim.69 The government had
asked the court to require an additional showing by the plaintiffs that
the phone numbers would be included in the results of government
queries of the database of call records or would be used as search
terms in querying the database.70 In other words, the government
asked for proof not only that it had acquired the records, but that it
was using them in a harmful way. This would likely have been impossible to do because of national security secrecy.
The Second Circuit denied the government’s request for a further
showing of harm beyond the collection of the records. The court explained, “[w]hether or not such claims prevail on the merits, appellants surely have standing to allege injury from the collection, and
maintenance in a government database, of records relating to them.”71
The seizure and maintenance of the call record information was
enough to give rise to injury in fact.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has also addressed standing to
sue the government for metadata surveillance, and thus addressed this
question of how to handle nonsensitive information collected and
stored in bulk.72 In a per curiam opinion, the panel vacated the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs.73 The
judges disagreed on whether the plaintiffs needed to definitively show
that they had themselves been subjected to government surveillance
versus showing a strong inference that they had been subjected to the
surveillance program. Writing individually, Judge Brown addressed
the issue of standing. Judge Brown explained that while the plaintiffs
had shown only a possibility that their own call records were collected,
they had successfully shown that the government operates a bulk-telephony metadata program collecting subscriber information and
could thus show an inference that their specific records had been collected.74 This, in his opinion, would be enough to satisfy the “bare
requirements of standing.”75 Judge Williams, writing individually, dis68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 560–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
Id. at 562
Id.
Id. at 562–64.
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agreed. He explained that he would not have found standing, because
the plaintiffs were not subscribers of Verizon Business Network Services, “the sole provider that the government has acknowledged
targeting for bulk collection.”76 Crucially, both judges, however,
agreed that if the plaintiffs could show that “records involving their
calls have actually been collected,” then they would have standing to
sue.77 Thus two panelists on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in fact
agreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion that collection of
metadata conveys standing.
These cases conclude that the seizure of call record information by
the government by itself gives rise to standing, without the need to
show additional economic or more tangible harms. These holdings
are particularly striking because call record information, a type of
“metadata,” has repeatedly been referred to in Fourth Amendment
caselaw as nonsensitive information.78 If the seizure and holding of
metadata can give rise to injury in fact, the bulk seizure and storage of
more sensitive information should get a plaintiff into court.
3. The “Chilling Effect” and Standing
National security surveillance cases have been the site of important
discussions of when a “chilling effect” can give rise to standing. The
chilling effect is a classic, well-recognized First Amendment injury,
which occurs when an individual self-censors in response to government action.79 The Fourth Circuit, for example, has held that the chilling effect is injury in fact for purposes of asserting a First
Amendment claim, so long as the self-censorship is objectively reasonable.80 Requiring a showing of an objectively reasonable chilling effect could be a compromise between requiring no showing of harm
apart from data seizure on the one hand, and recognizing only showings of economic or physical harm on the other.
In practice, however, whether the chilling effect can be asserted as
injury in fact in surveillance cases is a challenging question. In Am76. Id. at 565.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
79. See, e.g., Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In First Amendment cases,
the injury-in-fact element is commonly satisfied by a sufficient showing of ‘self-censorship, which
occurs when a claimant is chilled from exercising h[is] right to free expression.’ ” (quoting Benham v. City of Charlotte, 635 F.3d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 2011))).
80. Benham, 635 F.3d at 135. A chilling effect may constitute injury in fact if the government
action is “likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment
rights.” Id. (quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,
500 (4th Cir. 2005)).
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nesty, one of the harms asserted by the plaintiffs was that attorneys
could not speak freely with their clients because they feared surveillance, and had altered their behavior by refraining from speaking
openly or at all.81 The Court rejected this approach, holding that absent a more plausible showing that the surveillance programs actually
existed and applied to the plaintiffs, self-inflicted harms were not
enough to give rise to standing.82
But Amnesty does not answer whether a plausible chilling effect will
ever be adequate to convey standing. One way of understanding Amnesty’s reasoning about the chilling effect is that the plaintiffs’ selfcensoring behavior was not in fact reasonable in that case because the
plaintiffs had not plausibly shown that a surveillance program in fact
existed or that they themselves were subject to it.83 The other way to
understand Amnesty, however, is the way the late Justice Scalia would
have liked to characterize chilling effects: Chilling effects alone are
not enough to convey standing, absent a further showing of coercive
or punitive government action. Amnesty’s discussion of chilling effects is a window onto this larger debate.
Justice Scalia was generally skeptical of intangible injuries.84 This
skepticism was even more visible in the privacy context. The majority’s skepticism of chilling effects in Amnesty echoes a theme from
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence: Privacy harm is not real unless some
other bad thing happens.85
How the rest of the Supreme Court Justices feels about this is unclear. Relatively recent Court cases recognize privacy rights stemming
from the First Amendment’s protections of both speech and association.86 Justice Scalia believed that merely requiring an individual to
reveal her identity was not enough to show a First Amendment harm;
81. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013).
82. Id. at 1152–53.
83. See id. at 1151 (characterizing the Second Circuit holding as evaluating the plaintiffs’ harm
under a “relaxed reasonableness” standard, and observing that “respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly impending”).
84. See Kreimer, supra note 11, at 751 (“Justice Scalia and his acolytes take the position that
Article III doctrine requires a tough minded, common sense and practical approach. Injuries in
fact should be ‘tangible,’ ‘direct,’ ‘concrete,’ ‘de facto,’ realities . . . .”); see also Stephen I.
Vladeck, Standing After Scalia (Sept. 2, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2017/04/Standing-After-Scalia.pdf.
85. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149 (2013). The majority cites Justice
Scalia’s decision about chilling effects and surveillance from when he was a Court of Appeals
judge on the D.C. Circuit. Id.
86. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153 (2002); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 336 (1995); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
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the individual also, according to Justice Scalia, should have to show
evidence of possible retaliation against her for her speech.87 In a series of cases, the majority of the Court did not agree, and found that
when the government requires a person to identify herself as a
speaker, in writing, that coercion alone can constitute a First Amendment harm, with no additional evidence of retaliation needed.88
Whether a subjective chilling effect can constitute injury in fact for
purposes of challenging surveillance is less clear. The late Justice
Scalia’s views on the matter are again apparent. While sitting on the
D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Scalia wrote in United Presbyterian Church
in the U.S.A. v. Reagan89 that plaintiffs who asserted a “chilling effect”
did not have standing to challenge government surveillance under an
Executive Order.90 Sounding similar to courts in data breach cases
who look for visceral and vested harms, then-Judge Scalia explained
that the “harm of ‘chilling effect’ is to be distinguished from the immediate threat of concrete, harmful [government] action.”91 Justice
Scalia claimed that such an avenue to standing had been foreclosed by
an earlier Supreme Court case, Laird v. Tatum.92 He cited Laird for
the proposition that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a
threat of specific future harm.”93
In Amnesty, the majority cited Justice Scalia’s opinion in United
Presbyterian, among other cases, for the proposition that one cannot
achieve standing solely by invoking a “chilling effect” produced by a
subjective fear of being subjected to illegal government surveillance.94
However, Amnesty is fact-bound and not the last word. The Court
was largely concerned that the plaintiffs had failed to show the very
existence of a surveillance program under the challenged statute. In
the absence of that showing, plaintiffs clearly could not show that they
themselves were subject to surveillance and thus could not assert a
legitimate chilling effect.95 Amnesty does not foreclose recognition of
the chilling effect for purposes of finding standing when a surveillance
program has clearly been shown to exist and applies to the plaintiffs.
87. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 353.
89. 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 1380.
91. Id.
92. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
93. United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1378 (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14).
94. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013).
95. Id. at 1149, 1152–53 (listing the cases arising out of Laird, and concluding that “respondents’ self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the Government’s purported activities
under § 1881a, and their subjective fear of surveillance does not give rise to standing”).
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The earlier case, Laird v. Tatum, also does not foreclose a finding of
standing based on chilling effects arising from illicitly surveilling private communications, uncovering speakers’ hidden identities, or uncovering private associations.96 The Court in Laird did not address
illicit or illegal surveillance, but instead addressed the Army’s otherwise legal surveillance of individuals in public. As characterized two
years later by Justice Marshall, Laird stands primarily for the need for
specific, rather than general, allegations of a chilling effect.97 While
Justice Scalia hinged his call for tangible injury on Laird’s language
requiring the government to not just surveil behavior but affirmatively
proscribe it,98 Justice Marshall characterized that language as dicta.99
This all leaves the chilling effect in a nebulous place. On the one
hand, it is a well-recognized First Amendment injury, and the Supreme Court has recognized that forcing a person to identify herself
gets that person into court without any need to show subsequent,
more “tangible” harms. On the other hand, Amnesty suggests that it
will be difficult to use the chilling effect alone to achieve standing to
challenge privacy harms. It would be wrong to read Amnesty and
Laird to foreclose the use of specific allegations of chilling effects to
achieve standing. I, along with others, have argued this in a recent
amicus brief in the Fourth Circuit, for an ongoing case challenging
“Upstream” surveillance of the content of internet communications
under Section 702.100
In the data breach context, it is unclear how this would play out. As
discussed below, there are no First Amendment claims against private
actors. However, if Congress should decide to grant standing in a stat96. Laird, 408 U.S. at 9, 11 (noting that there was “no evidence of illegal or unlawful surveillance activities” (quoting Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971))).
97. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1319 (1974) (“In this case,
the allegations are much more specific: the applicants have complained that the challenged investigative activity will have the concrete effects of dissuading some YSA delegates from participating actively in the convention and leading to possible loss of employment for those who are
identified as being in attendance. Whether the claimed ‘chill’ is substantial or not is still subject
to question, but . . . [t]he specificity of the injury claimed . . . is sufficient, under Laird, to satisfy
the requirements of Art. III.”).
98. See United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1378 (“[I]n each of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or
compulsions that he was challenging.” (alteration in original) (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 11)).
99. Socialist Workers Party, 419 U.S. at 1318 (characterizing the discussion in Laird of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory exercises of government power as dicta “merely distinguishing
earlier cases, not setting out a rule for determining whether an action is justiciable or not”).
100. Brief of Amicus Curiae First Amendment Legal Scholars in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Supporting Reversal at 11, Wikimedia Found. v. NSA, 143 F. Supp. 3d 344 (4th Cir.
2016) (No. 15-2560), 2015 WL 13016204.
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ute based on harms that look like the chilling effect, one could argue
that similar assertions of chilling effects from an actual data breach or
illicit collection of information could be enough to satisfy Article III’s
requirements.
4. Other Gleanings About Data Harms
The national security surveillance case law is worth perusing for a
fourth reason: Apart from the decisions on standing specifically, these
cases contain interesting and complex analyses of privacy harms.
These analyses are more nuanced and more comprehending of the implications of Big Data than much of the judicial reasoning in the private data breach context.
This nuance reflects recent shifts by the Supreme Court in Fourth
Amendment case law. The Court recently appears to be more willing
to recognize the privacy harms associated with Big Data. In United
States v. Jones,101 for example, five justices noted that tracking an individual over twenty-eight days could give rise to significant privacy
harms by creating a complex portrait of that individual through the
accumulation and analysis of individual data points, and inferences
derived from them.102 Location data “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth
of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”103
In Riley v. California,104 the majority of the court (eight justices—
including Justice Scalia) found that searching an individual’s cell
phone caused cognizable privacy harms because of the vast amount of
data contained therein.105 The Court observed that
a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to
convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same
cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a
wallet.106

In national security surveillance litigation, few courts have addressed these types of privacy harms—in part because most of the litigation is early stage or is now moot after passage of the U.S.A.
Freedom Act changing the government’s phone records collection
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

565 U.S. 400 (2011).
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Id. at 2485.
Id. at 2489.
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program.107 The cases that have addressed the harm arising from
large databases, however, have been notable.
Writing after Jones but before Riley, Judge Leon of the District
Court for the District of Columbia explained that with the sheer quantity of data now available to the government, seizure of even ordinarily nonsensitive information now provides “an entire mosaic—a
vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”108 Similarly, the Second Circuit, while declining to reach the Constitutional
questions, sympathetically characterized the appellants’ argument as
follows: “the bulk collection of data as to essentially the entire population of the United States, something inconceivable before the advent
of high-speed computers, permits the development of a government
database with a potential for invasions of privacy unimaginable in the
past.”109 The court explained that while it decided the case on statutory rather than Constitutional grounds, “[t]he seriousness of the constitutional concerns . . . has some bearing on what we hold today
. . . .”110
Digital privacy has long been subjected to the much-bemoaned
third-party doctrine: The idea that once a person voluntarily shares
information with another, she relinquishes a privacy interest in that
information.111 This gremlin has raised its head in similar forms in
private sector litigation as well, with courts reading privacy statutes
not to apply to third parties because individuals voluntarily shared the
information with websites.112 FTC privacy enforcement, by contrast,
is triggered precisely because a person has shared their information
with a company, highlighting how ill-suited the third-party doctrine is
to the digital age.113 But recent case law suggests that courts are beginning to understand that vast quantities of data make a difference,
turning nonsensitive information into sensitive information through
readily-made inferences, and suggesting that privacy interests remain,
even when we entrust that information to third parties.114
107. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 825 (2d Cir. 2015).
108. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C.
Cir. 2015).
109. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 824.
110. Id.
111. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743–44 (1979). Another important component of this doctrine, however, is that the information shared is usually not sensitive.
112. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
113. Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L.
REV. 661, 674–75 (2015).
114. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
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5. Summary of Standing Lessons After Snowden
In summary, recent national security surveillance litigation may
yield lessons for discussions of standing in the data breach context.
First, if the hacked or breached information contains the content of
private communications, that breach alone may be cognizable injury
in fact. Second, even if the information illicitly gathered is less sensitive information, if it is gathered in large enough quantities and maintained in a database for analysis, that too should be a cognizable
harm. Third, the assertion of a specific, nonsubjective chilling effect
due to a breach or interception could be a harm. Fourth and finally,
courts in the national security and Fourth Amendment contexts appear more ready to recognize that profiling based on Big Data can
itself be a privacy harm.
6. Caveats
There are, of course, important differences between data breach litigation and First and Fourth Amendment litigation. In First and
Fourth Amendment cases, the government is the illicit actor, and in
both contexts, the government has enforcement and coercion powers
that private actors presumably do not. Perhaps for this reason—the
lack of a governmental Sword of Damocles—one could justify looking
for some additional more tangible, impending harm when private data
breaches occur. But courts do not bother to explain this; most just
assume without discussion that additional harm beyond illicit data acquisition must be shown. And most courts readily draw on Amnesty’s
standing analysis in the private sector context without distinguishing
between government and private sector behavior.
Another way to distinguish the data breach context is that the party
being sued is usually not the hacker, but the database holder. Perhaps
plaintiffs should have an easier time going after the perpetrator of an
illicit acquisition than after the hacked party housing the data. This
distinction seems, however, more appropriately made in discussions of
how fairly traceable the injury is to a defendant’s actions, not in discussions of whether the underlying injury constitutes injury in fact.
Congress can certainly decide either not to bestow statutory standing
or to create additional hurdles to obtaining damages against a defendant who carelessly housed the data. The question is whether courts
can, using Article III, obviate Congress’ decisions on when to give
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” because that “approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”).
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plaintiffs standing to sue. As Felix Wu points out in his contribution
to the 22nd Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, courts’ recent willingness to use Article III standing inquiries to
undermine legislative decisions on data harms seems to fly in the face
of the separation-of-powers justification for using Article III to restrict federal courts’ powers to begin with.115
IV.

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

AND THE

SECURITY STATE

Because the 22nd Annual Clifford Symposium is not just about data
theft, but also about corporate responsibility, I would be remiss if I
did not close by discussing corporate responsibility in light of national
security surveillance.
Corporations entrusted with consumer data stand to lose, and have
lost, enormous amounts of money when they lose consumer trust.116
Consumer trust includes trust that information will not be turned over
to the government wholesale. Since the Snowden leaks, companies
have seen global losses on an enormous scale.117 The recent collapse
of the E.U.-U.S. Safe Harbor agreement in the European Court of
Justice’s Schrems decision cemented the global economic impact of
national security surveillance.118 The replacement agreement between the E.U. and U.S.—the Privacy Shield—has been challenged in
Ireland on similar grounds, and could similarly disrupt digital trade.119
In 2014, Forrester Research, a technology research firm, predicted
that data security and privacy would be competitive differentiators in
2015.120 If the Apple-FBI debacle and recent WhatsApp encryption
115. See Felix Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439 (2017)
(manuscript at 2); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“[th]e law of
Article III standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the
powers of the political branches” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146
(2013))).
116. Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurtingbottom-line-of-tech-companies.html?_r=0%20.
117. Id. (indicating global losses as high as $180 billion).
118. Natasha Lomas, Europe’s Top Court Strikes Down ‘Safe Harbor’ Data-Transfer Agreement with U.S., TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/10/06/europes-topcourt-strikes-down-safe-harbor-data-transfer-agreement-with-u-s/; see also Lisa Mays & Scott
Maberry, The Schrems Decision: How the End of Safe Harbor Affects Your FCPA Compliance
Plan, GLOBAL TRADE L. BLOG (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.globaltradelawblog.com/2015/11/12/
the-schrems-decision-how-the-end-of-safe-harbor-affects-your-fcpa-compliance-plan/.
119. Karlin Lillington, Court Challenge to Privacy Shield Will Have Wide Reverberations,
IRISH TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/court-challenge-toprivacy-shield-will-have-wide-reverberations-1.2852231.
120. Heidi Shey et al., Predictions 2015: Data Security and Privacy Are Competitive Differentiators, FORRESTER (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.forrester.com/report/Predictions+2015‡ata+Se
curity+And+Privacy+Are+Competitive‡ifferentiators/-/E-RES116328.
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are any indicators, this is correct.121 Installing security that protects
consumers against government surveillance is only part of the battle,
however.
This Article closes by suggesting that corporations should take up
the mantle of challenging national security surveillance.122 Not only
do they have the deeper pockets to do so more effectively, but they
have two additional advantages related to standing that suggest they
are in the best position to challenge these programs. First, corporations have informational advantages; they often know when the government is asking to obtain user information, when users do not.
Second, because corporations have many users, they are better positioned to overcome the Amnesty “certainly impending” hurdle to
probabilistically show the likelihood that any one of their users is definitely being scrutinized.
A. Challenging Substantive Law
Corporations can challenge the substantive law that enables government surveillance. Corporations are both better equipped to challenge this surveillance because of deeper financial resources, and are
capable of challenging the surveillance of their customers even when
those users do not know they are being surveilled, or are otherwise
unable to bring claims themselves. Recently, we have seen several
companies engaging in this kind of policy litigation around
surveillance.
In 2016, Apple famously refused to unlock the iPhone of deceased
San Bernadino gunman Syed Rizwan Farook in response to the FBI’s
request.123 Apple CEO Tim Cook explained that the FBI’s request
not only threatened cybersecurity, but threatened user privacy, because smartphones are used “to store an incredible amount of personal information, from our private conversations to our photos, our
music, our notes . . . our financial information and health data, even
where we have been and where we are going.”124 While Apple liti121. Cade Metz, Forget Apple vs. the FBI: WhatsApp Just Switched on Encryption for a Billion People, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbiwhatsapp-just-switched-encryption-billion-people/.
122. For a longer and more general discussion of the roles of private actors in shaping the
“surveillance executive,” see Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
123. Elizabeth Weise, Apple v FBI Timeline: 43 Days that Rocked Tech, USA TODAY (Mar.
30, 2016, 10:46 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/15/apple-v-fbi-timeline/
81827400/.
124. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016) http://www.apple.com/
customer-letter/.
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gated the case, with two groups of a total of thirty-two technology
companies filing in support, the FBI eventually withdrew its legal
action.125
In 2015, Microsoft argued that it should not have to produce the
contents of an email account stored on a server located outside of the
United States.126 The Second Circuit decided for Microsoft.127 This
left the U.S. government to use more “cumbersome” methods outlined in international agreements with other countries if it wanted to
obtain the emails.128 Scholars dispute the value of this holding for
privacy. On the one hand, it is a win by a technology company against
a government request for customer emails. Numerous public interest
groups supported Microsoft’s appeal with amicus briefs.129 The case is
also a win for individual country sovereignty, for those countries that
wish to protect privacy more than it is protected in the United
States.130 On the other hand, the case holds that U.S. privacy law does
not apply abroad, so if U.S. law is better than the privacy standards of
a particular country, the case could be a loss for privacy.131
Both the Apple-FBI challenge and the Microsoft challenge point to
an increasing willingness on the part of companies to substantively
challenge surveillance law on behalf of their users. Other companies
have also joined the fray. Yahoo challenged foreign-intelligence surveillance in the FISA court.132 Facebook challenged a sealed bulk
125. Kif Leswing, Apple Won Its Battle Against the FBI, But the War Isn’t Over Yet, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-won-fbi-battle-but-the-war-isntover-2016-3.
126. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2016).
127. Id. at 220 (“[E]xecution of the Warrant would constitute an unlawful extraterritorial application of the Act.”).
128. Id. at 221 (“[T]he current process for obtaining foreign-stored data is cumbersome. That
process is governed by a series of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”) between the
United States and other countries, which allow signatory states to request one another’s assistance with ongoing criminal investigations, including issuance and execution of search
warrants.”).
129. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail, 829 F.3d at 199. The ACLU, the Constitution
Project, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an amicus brief siding with Microsoft; so
did the Center for Democracy and Technology.
130. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Microsoft Just Won a Big Victory Against Government Surveillance—Why It Matters, LINKEDIN (Jul. 15, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/microsoft-justwon-big-victory-against-government-why-daniel-solove?articleId=6159558655122427905#com
ments-6159558655122427905&trk=prof-post; see also @jreidenberg, TWITTER (Jul. 14, 2016, 8:41
AM), https://twitter.com/jreidenberg/status/753615536043520000.
131. Andrew Keane Woods, Reactions to the Microsoft Warrant Case, LAWFARE (Jul. 15, 2016,
7:21 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/reactions-microsoft-warrant-case.
132. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
551 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
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search warrant for 381 user accounts.133 This is likely in the companies’ business interests, as users purportedly shop for companies who
provide data security and withstand government surveillance.134 As
skeptics point out, however, corporate challenges to government requests for users’ data have been few and far between, because of longstanding structural alliances between government and
communications companies.135 It “may be too early to tell” whether
the post-Snowden market will continue to encourage these types of
litigation.136
B. Challenging National Security Letters and Gag Orders
In the wake of Snowden, companies have also challenged their inability to communicate with the public about the extent of government surveillance. Numerous statutes prevent communications
companies from disclosing surveillance orders to the public or to those
being surveilled.137 Recently, companies have challenged these gag
orders as restrictions on their freedom of speech.
In early days after the Snowden leaks, Facebook, Yahoo, and
Microsoft won permission to include FISA requests in their releases
of the overall number of court orders received.138 Google asked the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to ease its gag order, citing
First Amendment concerns.139 In October 2014, Twitter sued the government, challenging its inability to disclose the number of surveillance requests it receives.140 In May 2016, a federal judge dismissed
133. In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23 (App. Div. 2015);
James C. McKinley Jr., Court Weighs Facebook’s Right to Challenge Search Warrants on Users’
Behalf, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/12/nyregion/courtweighsfacebooks-right-to-challenge-search-warrants-on-users-behalf.html.
134. Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment,
100 IOWA L. REV. 1441, 1481–82 (2015) (describing increased corporate response to government
surveillance, post-Snowden, in reaction to market forces).
135. Id. at 1473 (“The government and tech companies enjoy a close, interdependent relationship that is highly beneficial to both sectors.”).
136. Id. at 1484.
137. See 11-Year Legal Battle Ends with Clinic Victory, YALE L. SCH. (Nov. 30, 2015), https://
www.law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/11-year-legal-battle-ends-clinic-victory; see also 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2513, 2515 (2012).
138. Craig Timberg & Cecilia Kang, Google Challenges U.S. Gag Order, Citing First Amendment, WASH. POST (June 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/
google-challenges-us-gag-order-citing-first-amendment/2013/06/18/96835c72-d832-11e2-a9f2-42
ee3912ae0e_story.html.
139. Id.
140. Ben Lee, Taking the Fight for #transparency to Court, TWITTER BLOG (Oct. 7, 2014, 5:19
PM), https://blog.twitter.com/2014/taking-the-fight-for-transparency-to-court (describing Twitter’s First Amendment challenge to restrictions on disclosure of the number of national security
letters, or NSLs, and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ACT (FISA) court orders received).
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the case, explaining that Twitter had failed to challenge underlying
classification decisions.141 Litigation in the Twitter case is ongoing.142
Limited success in the national security realm has not stopped companies from challenging gag orders in other areas of surveillance law.
In 2015, Yahoo successfully challenged a gag order indefinitely
prohibiting it from disclosing a grand jury subpoena seeking subscriber account information.143 And in 2016, Microsoft filed a lawsuit
challenging the gag order provision of the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act on both Fourth Amendment and First Amendment grounds.144 A federal judge found in February 2017 that
Microsoft had standing under the First Amendment to move forward
with its challenge.145
C. Why Corporations Are Better Situated for Getting into Court
The current structure of U.S. surveillance law largely leaves citizens
disempowered. Often, surveillance is secret, citizens do not even
know they are being surveilled, and thus have no way to challenge the
surveillance. I wholeheartedly agree with critics of this system, and
believe that the current level of secrecy is deeply problematic.146 Corporations are far from perfect stand-ins for citizen rights.147
However, in our imperfect world, the ethical corporation should
stand up on behalf of its consumers. Companies know far more about
the extent of government surveillance than users do.148
Bringing this Article’s discussion of standing full circle: Companies
are also better situated to assert surveillance challenges than individ141. Twitter, Inc. v. Holder, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
142. Elizabeth Banker, #Transparency Update: Twitter Discloses National Security Letters,
TWITTER BLOG (Jan. 27, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com/2017/transparency-update-twitter-disclos
es-national-security-letters.
143. Dan Levine, Judge Rules that Justice Dept. Can’t Indefinitely Gag Yahoo on Subscriber
Info Subpoena (Feb. 6, 2015, 8:40 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/2015/02/judge-rules-that-justice
-dept-cant-indefinitely-gag-yahoo-on-subscriber-info-subpoena/.
144. Steve Lohr, Microsoft Sues Justice Department to Protest Electronic Gag Order Statute,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/technology/microsoft-sues-usover-orders-barring-it-from-revealing-surveillance.html.
145. See Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C16-0538JLR, 2017 WL 530353, at *6
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2017). The court did not evaluate third-party standing under the First
Amendment because it found that Microsoft had standing to sue on its own behalf. Id. at *14
(“Microsoft therefore need not show third-party standing as to its First Amendment claim.”).
146. Cover, supra note 134, at 1501 (“[I]ndividuals should normally receive notice of government surveillance and acquisition of their data.”).
147. Id. at 1441.
148. Rozenshtein, supra note 122, at 44 (“Because surveillance intermediaries are intimately
familiar with the details of the surveillance programs with which they are required to cooperate,
they avoid the knowledge problems that doom other plaintiffs.”).
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ual users. Amnesty’s requirement that a plaintiff show “certainly impending” harm presents a significant challenge for a person who has
been given no notice that she is subject to government surveillance.
By contrast, a company that knows who has definitely been surveilled
is better situated to bring third-party challenges to the substance of
surveillance orders. Companies can also enable users to know
whether they have in fact been surveilled. Microsoft, for example, has
standing to challenge the gag order provisions in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act because it can definitively point to a check
on its ability to speak.149 If the gag orders are lifted, then individuals
will be better situated to show injury in fact for purposes of their own
claims.
At least some companies can assert standing on behalf of their
users. Wikimedia asserted third-party standing on behalf of its users
in a recent challenge to national security Upstream surveillance.150
Courts have held in the First Amendment context that entities, such as
newspapers and internet service providers, have standing to assert the
rights of their readers and posters.151 In the recent Microsoft ECPA
litigation, however, the district court rejected the assertion of thirdparty standing for Fourth Amendment claims.152 The court was silent
as to whether Microsoft could assert third-party First Amendment
claims.153 In 2008, however, the FISA court of appeals held that Yahoo could assert third-party standing for Fourth Amendment claims
on behalf of its users.154
Companies and non-profit organizations can potentially use their
sheer size, compared to individual users, to assert a likelihood of
149. Microsoft Corp., 2017 WL 530353, at *6.
150. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 61, Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 15-2650
(4th Cir. Feb 17, 2016), 2016 WL 703452, at *61. Again, full disclosure: I participated as author
of an amicus brief. See Brief of Amici Curiae First Amendment Legal Scholars in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Supporting Reversal at 1, Wikimedia, No. 15-2650 (4th Cir. Feb. 24,
2016), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/wikimedia-v-nsa-amicus-brief-first-amendment-legal
-scholars.
151. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 95–96 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Enterline v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782, 786 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
152. Microsoft Corp., 2017 WL 530353, at *16 (“[T]he Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
have routinely held in a variety of circumstances that a plaintiff may not assert the Fourth
Amendment rights of another person.”).
153. Microsoft Corp., 2017 WL 530353, at *14 (“Microsoft therefore need not show thirdparty standing as to its First Amendment claim.”).
154. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
551 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); see Rozenshtein, supra note 122, at 24 (“the Yahoo
case relied on specific language in the FISA Statute, [but] it could become an important general
precedent in surveillance cases if courts take a broad reading of its permissive approach to vindicating third-party rights.”).
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standing. Wikimedia pointed to the sheer number of its communications to argue a high probability that “the government is copying and
reviewing at least some of its trillion or more annual communications.”155 The lower court rejected this claim; it remains to be seen as
of publication of this Article whether the Fourth Circuit will be more
amenable to it. If so, then companies will be able to more successfully
assert “certainly impending” injury, since they are composed of many
people, at least some of whom are likely to have been surveilled.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has assessed the problem of privacy harms and Article
III standing from a perhaps unconventional perspective. While privacy harms continue to trouble courts in the context of data breach
and private data privacy litigation, in the national security surveillance
context interesting and informative trends have emerged. In the national security context, courts appear to be prepared to recognize as
harmful the interception of content, database storage and analysis,
and a wider array of data-related harms. This Article argues that the
chilling effect can be a recognized privacy harm, even in light of discouraging dicta in Supreme Court case law. Finally, this Article
closed by returning to a theme of the 22nd Annual Clifford Symposium: corporate responsibility. Companies are themselves driving
changes in privacy law by challenging government surveillance and restrictions on their abilities to communicate with the public about surveillance. While relying on corporations to vindicate citizens’ rights is
problematic, recent lawsuits suggest that privacy—at least vis-a-vis the
government—is in the wake of the Snowden leaks becoming a component of corporate responsibility.

155. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 150, at 24.
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